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Civil Disobedience in Transnational Perspective: 
American and West German Anti-Nuclear- 
Power Protesters, 1975-1982 
Michael L. Hughes ∗ 
Abstract: »Ziviler Ungehorsam in transnationaler Perspektive. Amerikanische 
und Westdeutsche AKW-Gegner 1975-1982«. Transnational transfers are in prac-
tice transnational adaptations. Ideas and practices from one culture can only 
be implemented in another in the context of the target culture’s values, insti-
tutions, and history. So there is no reason to expect that Germans would or 
should have simply adopted the American nonviolent civil disobedience model 
– to the contrary. And when Germans did look to that model, they proved more 
open to violence against things and even against people than their American 
counterparts. And rather than accepting punishment for deliberately breaking 
the law as honorable result of a commitment to democratic governance, Ger-
mans rejected it as “criminalization” of dissent. Civil disobedience in the US de-
veloped amid a powerful religious basis and broad acceptance of the American 
system’s legitimacy. It developed in Germany amid a constitutional right to “re-
sistance” and widespread doubts about the existing system’s legitimacy. Hence, 
many West German anti-nuclear protesters could find militant, perhaps violent, 
activism fully justified and could deny to the state they mistrusted any right to 
treat protesters as criminals, apparently no matter what laws they broke. 
Keywords: Civil disobedience, transnational, nonviolence, criminalization of 
demonstrators. 
1.  Introduction 
When West German citizens occupied a proposed nuclear-power-plant site at 
Wyhl, they followed the model of French protesters who had occupied the site 
of a proposed lead factory in Marckolsheim in the Alsace (Mossmann 1975). 
The Wyhl site-occupation subsequently inspired American citizens to occupy 
the proposed nuclear-plant site at Seabrook, New Hampshire. West Germans 
had since the 1960s known of and implemented some civil disobedience tactics 
(Klimke 2010, 44, 53-4; Ebert 1984), but forms of civil disobedience used at 
Seabrook in turn inspired subsequent West German actions at nuclear-plant and 
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nuclear-missile sites. Transnational connections existed. Yet the picture proves 
complicated when one looks closely at anti-nuclear protests, such as those at 
Seabrook and Diablo Canyon in the US and at Brokdorf and Gorleben in West 
Germany. In examining publications from and about groups such as the Clam-
shell and Abalone Alliances in the US and the Bundesverband Bürgerinitia-
tiven Umweltschutz (BBU) and Bürgerinitiative Umweltschutz Unterelbe 
(BUU) in Germany, it is obvious that transnational transfer cannot occur 
through simple adoption of foreign models. Rather, those in the target culture 
must adapt what they receive, to make it usable in the context of their own 
culture, values, traditions, and needs. 
Scholars have only begun exploring systematically how such transnational 
transfers occur (Chabot and Duyvendak 2002; Werner and Zimmermann 2006; 
Meyer 2011). While Martin Klimke (2010) reviews early West German reac-
tions to civil disobedience and Christian Joppke (1993) notes debates in Amer-
ican and West German anti-nuclear movements over nonviolence, scholars of 
the transnational have not yet focused on civil disobedience. American anti-
nuclear activists drew primarily on their own history of civil disobedience, so 
this article will explore transnational transfer by focusing on the West German 
reception of the American civil disobedience model. It will not explore the 
direct mechanisms of exchange among anti-nuclear protesters. Rather, it will 
explore how West Germans, acting through a broad social movement, actually 
applied in their culture strategies of civil disobedience developed in a different 
culture. 
Simply making ideas and practices from one culture available in another 
cannot produce the same effects in both. The members of the target culture 
have to adapt those ideas and practices, to incorporate them in a very different 
context. As Chabot and Duyvendak (2002, 701-2, 706) point out, discussions 
of transnational diffusion often have a misleading essentialist bias, treating 
what diffuses as “pre-given, fixed, and coherent entities,” when in fact “diffu-
sion items may be dynamic, ambiguous, and malleable.” Hence, transnational 
interactions are not simple transfers but rather complex processes in which 
elements do not stay intact but change. (Werner and Zimmermann 2004) Al-
though studies of transnational exchange can speak of “functional equivalents,” 
(Wehler 2010) functional substitutes might be a better term. Because diffusion 
can be dynamic and malleable, elements that develop out of a transfer to a 
target state can be substantively and significantly different from what obtained 
in the originating country. 
Hence, there is no reason to expect that Germans would or should have 
simply adopted the American civil disobedience model – to the contrary. A few 
Germans did choose to adopt the US model as normative, as a pre-given, fixed, 
and coherent entity. Most West Germans, however, took from that model only 
those aspects that they saw as useful and then adapted them in varying ways to 
their circumstances. Some elements, such as affinity groups, were easily adapt-
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able. However, the West German anti-nuclear movement could not fully im-
plement the commitment to nonviolence and openness to accepting the legal 
consequences of civil disobedience which characterized the American anti-
nuclear movement. On the one hand, it lacked the specific history of nonviolent 
civil disobedience, the broad religious belief, and the acceptance of the state’s 
legitimacy that characterized the US; on the other hand, it had a deep mistrust 
of the state, active militants open to violence, and a rhetoric of resistance that 
could justify militant action and a refusal to take the state and its laws com-
pletely seriously. 
2.  Transnational Adaptations 
2.1  Looking Abroad for Models of Direct Action 
The first transnational anti-nuclear influence ran from West Germany to the 
US. West Germans occupied the site of a planned nuclear-power plant at Wyhl 
and forced an eventual end to construction. Two Americans who visited Wyhl 
proposed using that occupation as a model to stop construction of a nuclear-
power plant at Seabrook (Wasserman 1977). Anna Gyorgy was a major con-
duit, or transnational mediator, as Kirchhof and Meyer (2014) define it in the 
introduction to this special issue, as she introduced Americans to West German 
developments, based on her reading and discussions with visiting German 
activists. The Seabrook occupations became a model for anti-nuclear-power 
groups across the US.1 
West German activists explicitly looked to Seabrook as a model for con-
ducting an effective direct action, especially civil disobedience, against the 
nuclear-power industry. Germans had occasionally broken laws in pursuit of 
political goals (e.g., socialist activities under the Anti-Socialist Laws in the 
19th century), and their protest movements had adapted some American civil-
disobedience techniques, such as the sit-in. Nonetheless, they lacked a self-
conscious tradition of civil disobedience as legitimate political action in a de-
mocracy (Rucht 1984). The American experience offered theoretical and prac-
tical models. Some West Germans drew on the broad theoretical discussions in 
the US (Ebert 1984; Glotz 1983); others looked to practice (Sternstein 1981a, 
44). BBU leader Jo Leinen was at the 1977 Seabrook occupation, and, Anna 
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Gyorgy wrote, German activists visited Seabrook “specifically to learn ways of 
organizing non-violent civil disobedience demonstrations” (Gyorgy 1979, 396).2 
2.2  Organization 
An explicit borrowing lay in organization. The American anti-nuclear move-
ment’s use of civil disobedience was rooted in the Society of Friends (Quak-
ers), a religious sect committed to social justice (Bell 1968, 9, 33). Leftists 
from a rural commune and local Seabrook-area activists met in early 1976 to 
form the “Clamshell Alliance,” as an umbrella for groups opposing the planned 
Seabrook plant. For advice on organizing a nonviolent mass movement, they 
invited to the meeting two Quaker activists (one of whom would head training 
for the Clamshell). The Quakers brought the idea of organizing each action 
around affinity groups, preferably pre-existing but if necessary ad hoc groups 
of individuals who would support one another during an action, provide a deci-
sion-making structure, and assist in isolating provocateurs. Absolutely commit-
ted, as Quakers, to nonviolence, they established that participation in an intense 
training session in nonviolent protest would be a prerequisite for participation 
in any Clamshell Alliance direct action (e.g., occupation) (Wasserman 1977, 
15; Gyorgy 1979, 397). Affinity groups and training were, hopefully, to ensure 
that each individual would act responsibly and nonviolently under the stress of 
an action. Quakers also brought a centuries-old tradition of consensus decision-
making. Other American anti-nuclear alliances emulated these practices.3 
West German activists in groups such as the Hamburger Initiative Kirchli-
che Mitarbeiter und gewaltfreie Aktion and the Republic of the Free Wendland 
sought to adopt the model of affinity groups and training – though the move-
ment as a whole did not. Affinity groups made sense as a way to organize a 
complex, potentially dangerous action. In promoting affinity groups, West 
Germans shared American goals: mutual support under police pressure, easier 
decision-making, and isolating provocateurs. Germans who planned blockades 
did seek to organize training, but unlike the Americans, Germans in the late 
1970s and early 1980s anti-nuclear movement never sought to train every pro-
tester who would engage in a site occupation or blockade (Painke 1997). A 
particular problem was the appearance at direct actions in West Germany of 
relatively large militant groups with their own agendas. The West Germans did 
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implement an American-style consensus process at a site occupation near 
Gorleben (Republic of the Free Wendland). Yet West German groups did not 
commit themselves to consensus decision-making, as American anti-nuclear 
alliances did. The American anti-nuclear movement could call here on the 
Quaker’s and Civil Rights Movement’s histories of training and the Quaker 
tradition of consensus to encourage people to acquiesce in these policies, while 
the Germans had no such precedent to prompt people to comply.4 
2.3  Nonviolence, Violence, and Love 
While nonviolence was a central principle for movements in both countries, 
debates over defining violence/Gewalt plagued both. Both debated whether 
violence against things was acceptable. A few American environmentalists did 
engage in vandalism or sabotage, but the movement overwhelmingly rejected 
it. Many American activists held that even fence-cutting, as destruction of 
property, was not acceptable. The Clamshell Alliance would split over this 
issue, as a militant minority argued for cutting fences, but even the militants 
rejected broader property destruction (Zunes 1978, 30). Other American anti-
nuclear alliances also explicitly rejected any property destruction or sabotage 
(Birchler and Miller 1981, 29). Although the BBU and other groups generally 
rejected violence against things, not every German protester agreed (Rucht 
1984). And once German nuclear-plant contractors began elaborately fortifying 
their sites, widespread support existed, even in the BBU, for piercing those 
fortifications however necessary. Moreover, sabotage of construction- and 
power-company equipment often accompanied German anti-nuclear actions. 
Hence, as West Germans adapted the American model, commitment to private 
property proved less constraining in West Germany than in the US – mostly 
because in the US anti-nuclear activists broadly agreed that property destruc-
tion would too sharply erode popular support.5 
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Beyond violence against things, some German opponents of nuclear power 
were willing to accept violence against persons, which was unacceptable in the 
American movement (Daubert and Moran 1985, 12). Facing a racist, often 
violent White majority, 1950s African-Americans, who developed the Ameri-
can civil-disobedience tradition in the Deep South, dared not risk violence 
against persons. Moreover, for all the violence that has plagued the US on an 
individual level and, crucially, in racial politics, by the 1970s resort to violence 
against persons by radicals was a marginal phenomenon (Varon 2004; Zunes 
1978). So even when relatively militant Americans sought to break through the 
fence around Seabrook in the face of a big police and National Guard deploy-
ment, they promised to forgo any violence toward individuals (Rodenko 1979). 
And they did not resort to stone-throwing or other attacks on law-enforcement 
personnel. As a report from the conservative Rand Corporation on anti-nuclear 
protest stated, “There are no documented instances of any acts by U. S. groups 
that might have constituted violence against persons” (Daubert and Moran 
1985, 12).6 
Major German proponents of a willingness to resort to violence against per-
sons were members of the K-Gruppen, the competing communist splinter par-
ties, or of the anarchist Autonomen. These groups saw anti-nuclear activism 
primarily as a tool to broaden the constituency for their larger political projects 
(Markovits and Gorski 1993). In denouncing nuclear plants, though, they as-
serted that the “terroristic Gewalt” of the bourgeoisie in building nuclear plants 
must be met by the “revolutionary Gewalt” of the masses. They argued, cor-
rectly, that even nonviolent protesters would face police brutality, so they 
might as well defend themselves; they asked what a couple of stones were 
compared to the violence of the police, what a stick was compared to Hiroshi-
ma. And numerous anti-nuclear demonstrations in West Germany included 
extended battles between police and groups of rock-throwing Leftists. Ameri-
can and German anti-nuclear-power movements opposed violence against 
persons. However, Germany’s militants were numerous enough that Germans 
were unable to enforce nonviolence against the determined minority that em-
braced violence (Kühle 1976, 66).7 
An explicit emphasis on the humanity of one’s opponents strongly influ-
enced American but not German civil disobedience. American Civil Rights 
leaders rooted in Christian belief (usually clergymen) had insisted that protest-
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ers must “love” their opponents. Yet the oppressed minority of African-
Americans concurred because they sought to minimize violent opposition from 
Southerners who had feared race war for centuries and had often engaged in 
lynching (Bell 1968, 26, 36-7, 111-4; King 1958, 84-7, 98; Washington 1991, 
164-5). The more secular anti-nuclear-power movement, whose members had 
often experienced brutal conflicts with police during anti-Vietnam War demon-
strations, similarly embraced an explicit commitment to treat one’s opponents 
as “human beings,” to avoid renewed conflicts (Kidder 1978, 72) American 
protesters had also learned to meet with police and Guard before each protest, 
to describe their intentions (Daubert and Moran 1985, 7). And when the Clam-
shell Alliance held a dance one year after 1,414 of them had been arrested and 
held for up to two weeks, they invited the National Guardsmen and State 
Troopers who had guarded them to join the fun. German protesters did occa-
sionally say that their enemy was the nuclear power industry and the state, not 
the police; but they had not learned to seek meetings with police, and when a 
few did, other activists denounced them for betrayal. German Protestant clergy 
did seek to mediate between police and demonstrators, but officials and many 
demonstrators were dismissive of them (Kühle 1976, 66). And even when 
protesters prepared flyers for the police, they could be snarky (“To the 
uni(n)formed officials”) (Zint 1980, 55, 102). Hence, the relationship between 
demonstrators and law enforcement was much more fraught in Germany than 
in the US, in the violence of some militants and in the abusive language often 
directed at police. Partly this reflected the greater influence in Germany of 
militant groups open to violence, though undoubtedly also the significantly 
higher levels of police brutality at German than at American anti-nuclear 
demonstrations. Yet it also reflected a singular emphasis in the American 
movement on human interconnection, an emphasis rooted in African-
Americans’ particular needs in a racist South, in many protesters’ religious 
commitments, and in recent experiences.8 
2.4  Arrest and Punishment 
The American willingness to accept arrest and punishment as part of civil diso-
bedience is an anomaly. This notion, developed as a weapon of the oppressed 
in a nominally free society, was rooted in Thoreau and Gandhi but powerfully 
reinforced by the Civil Rights movement. Certainly, most American protesters 
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preferred to avoid punishment if they could and would argue for acquittal when 
tried. A very few American activists did reject any need to accept punishment 
in a fight against “immoral” laws (Zinn 1968). Yet the willingness to accept 
arrest remained central to the American anti-nuclear movement (Bircheler and 
Miller 1981). At American anti-nuclear-power demonstrations, thousands were 
arrested. Indeed, when the Clamshell Alliance decided, under pressure from 
locals, to replace an illegal site occupation with a legal demonstration, a num-
ber of demonstrators complained vociferously that they would miss their 
chance to be arrested. Crucially, most Americans accepted the legitimacy of the 
American system as self-evident. So even if one saw problems serious enough 
that one would disobey the law to call attention to them, one still had to accept 
punishment, to acknowledge that legitimacy and to emphasize the sincerity of 
one’s objections and one’s willingness to sacrifice (Peters 2012, 5, 29-32, 37-8; 
Smith and Zepp 1986, 54-5, 59, 61, 68). Some protesters did hope that mass 
arrests would so overburden the system as to move the government to recon-
sider its support for nuclear power. One would not expect middle- and upper-
middle-class citizens anywhere to risk going to jail. The unusual willingness of 
significant numbers of Americans to do so rests on the moral force of the suc-
cessful American Civil Rights movement and the broad legitimacy of the US 
political system.9 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s anti-nuclear movement, a small number of 
West Germans did embrace being willing to go to jail as a crucial element in 
civil disobedience (Glotz 1983). They believed, with activist and student of 
nonviolence Wolfgang Sternstein, that their “willingness to accept detrimental 
consequences” would help them win over the majority and that “willingly accept-
ing the punishments for infringing the law would show that their resistance was 
serious” (Sternstein 1981b, 26). A few demonstrators even voluntarily confessed 
to police that they had been at a banned demonstration where some were arrested, 
saying that “if you convict others, then you must convict me” (Zint 1980, 140). 
And some West Germans did also envision mass arrests gumming up the system, 
provoking the government to rethink the nuclear program.10 
Americans and Germans reacted very differently to the experience of arrest. 
Americans certainly complained about the food, the toilet facilities, and the 
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arbitrariness of jail. Yet the predominant tone in their descriptions of arrest is, 
curiously enough, almost joyous. Protesters felt that they were engaged in an 
admirable act of civil courage and that being arrested proved that their actions 
were serious. Mass arrests leading to mass incarceration, sometimes for days, 
meant that protesters got to create in jail a community of the honorable (Bircheler 
and Miller, 47-57; Rosenblith 1977, 8). Thoreau and the Civil Rights Movement 
had convinced American protesters that sometimes the honorable citizen belongs 
in jail. The predominant tone among German anti-nuclear-power-plant protest-
ers reporting on being arrested is resentment. Even having to provide finger-
prints was repeatedly denounced, described as “the most humiliating moment 
of my life.” Again, Germans could not look back to a powerful, honored tradi-
tion that legitimated what was, after all, a socially problematic and often pain-
ful arrest experience. And the normal pattern in Germany was to take protest-
ers’ personal data and release them within hours, so the extended experience of 
communal arrest was not available. Fear that arrest would lead to a Berufsver-
bot, a ban on any government employment, played some role (though it did not 
prevent thousands from risking arrest at anti-nuclear-missile demonstrations a 
couple of years later). Moreover, German protesters reported far more brutality 
by police in taking even nonviolent demonstrators into custody than did Ameri-
cans, which certainly made the prospect of arrest less appealing (Kleinert 1981, 
32). Reasonably enough, people everywhere normally see arrest as a terrifying, 
humiliating experience. One can perhaps find it relatively easy, intellectually, to 
identify arrest for a cause as honorable – but it takes unusual historical and social 
support to experience it as honorable, support that, for historical reasons, Ameri-
cans had and Germans, ca. 1980, did not.11 
2.5  “Criminalization” and “Solidarity” 
While a few West Germans would accept arrest and punishment for civil diso-
bedience, the movement as a whole rejected the notion that protesters should 
expect to be arrested and punished if they engaged in civil disobedience. When 
Sternstein participated in a blockade, he complained that many of his fellow 
protesters were grossly ignorant of the principles of nonviolent action, includ-
ing the willingness to accept the consequences of, the punishment for, breaking 
the law (Sternstein 1982). And while German groups such as the BBU and 
BUU embraced nonviolence and civil disobedience, they did not present going to 
jail or accepting other punishments as an admirable and necessary outcome of 
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breaking the law. Instead, their comments on state attempts to punish those who 
committed civil disobedience generally dismissed punishment as unacceptable.12 
Many anti-nuclear protesters simply rejected the notion that breaking the 
law in an effort to stop potentially disastrous nuclear-plant construction could 
be a criminal act. Site occupations and blockades clearly broke German law. 
Yet German anti-nuclear protesters rejected any attempt to hold people ac-
countable, complaining that doing so was “criminalization of dissent,” imply-
ing that in this context, acts of law-breaking were not in fact crimes. Even 
while citing “the generally recognized actions of Martin Luther King” (who 
had of course proudly gone to jail), a protester who signed himself “Günter 
from Marburg” insisted that blockaders must “attack the sanctions against us 
morally, theologically, legal-philosophically, and politically” to “defend 
against legal sanctions now and in the future.” Protesters often insisted they 
should not be held accountable for breaking the law because of their righteous 
motives and often demanded amnesty for every anti-nuclear protester accused 
of a crime, any crime. The “Osnabrücker” wrote to Atom Express, “What we 
did in Brokdorf does not have even a hint of the criminal, but rather was fully 
justified resistance to the life-threatening nuclear energy” so that “each and 
every legal proceeding against opponents of nuclear plants must be terminated 
immediately and without conditions!!! [sic]”13 
The rhetoric around the trial of two protesters, Michael Duffke and Markus 
Mohr, illuminates the role of fears of “criminalization” and calls for “solidari-
ty” in the way many German anti-nuclear-power protesters addressed law-
breaking. The press published – and republished – a photo from a Brokdorf 
demonstration that showed demonstrators beating a police officer. After a 
nation-wide manhunt, police identified Duffke and Mohr as among the attack-
ers, and they were convicted of assault. Interestingly, anti-nuclear activists did 
not argue that they were innocent. Rather, many argued they should be freed 
because the assault took place after police had brutally attacked (other) demon-
strators, so that it was a matter of “self-defense.” Or that the authorities had 
more or less arbitrarily chosen to make an example of these two, which they 
had, so that the accusations against them were really aimed at “criminalizing” 
all anti-nuclear protesters. Hence, “solidarity” required that all protesters de-
                                                             
12  See. e.g., Steuerstreik wird erwogen, Frankfurter Rundschau 16. Feb. 1977, PA Presse, 102-
18/24, 1; Wo Recht zu Unrecht wird, wird der Widerstand zur Pflicht, Unsere Zeit 27 Feb. 
1981, ibid. 
13  Was wir fordern und warum, Easter 1975, in Wüstenhagen, 1975, 85; Bürgerinitiative Um-
weltschutz Unterelbe/Hamburg, Kommt massenhaft! PAB Brokdorf Bewegung 76/77; Die 
Braunschweiger Beschlüsse, graswurzel revolution 40 (Mar./Apr. 1979): 29; M.S. Noch grö-
ßer als Hannover? radikal. Sozialistische Zeitung für Westberlin (Extrablatt August 1979), in 
PAB Gorleben Wendland Bewegung, -1982; Günter, Marburg, Abwehr und Verwertung der 
juristischen Repression nach der Blockade vom Juli 8! AA H Brokdorf-Blockaden Gewaltfreie 
Aktionsgruppen;. Brief der Osnabrücker, Atom Express 25 (July/Aug. 1981): 14. 
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mand that the two men be set free, implicitly whether they were guilty or inno-
cent of assault (Dokumentation zum Brokdorf 1982; Spörl 1982; Markovits and 
Gorski 1993, 104). When one anti-nuclear activist noted that some demonstra-
tors – whether Duffke and Mohr or not – at a supposedly nonviolent anti-
nuclear demonstration had brutally attacked a police officer, a human being, 
she was reviled for breaking solidarity. By focusing on possible “criminaliza-
tion” of dissent and the primacy of solidarity, German protesters were implicit-
ly – but often vehemently – rejecting a conception of civil disobedience as 
accepting, as a matter of conscience, the consequences of the deliberate break-
ing of valid laws.14 
In part, German protesters focused on the threat of criminalization of all pro-
testers because some politicians were acting as though they wanted to suppress, 
and perhaps criminalize, demonstrations in the Federal Republic. Some US 
officials acted similarly, but they had little impact in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Wasserman 1978, 15). In West Germany, police at demonstrations were gratu-
itously brutal in dealing with demonstrators, but no one was prosecuted for 
such brutality; indeed, politicians had only praise for police for dealing with 
“disorder.” Authorities imposed blanket, geographically far-reaching bans on 
several big demonstrations, which made attending the demonstrations a crime. 
And the most massive instances of civil disobedience involved tens of thou-
sands of citizens violating such bans by demonstrating (though they scarcely 
expected that police could arrest individuals amid such enormous crowds). 
Moreover, the CDU/CSU pushed to reverse the 1970 liberalization of demon-
stration law, putatively to make it easier to capture the violent few but in ways 
that would have limited demonstration rights. And some Land governments 
sought to impose on individual protesters the policing costs and damages aris-
ing from demonstrations – in ways that seemed designed to so intimidate citi-
zens that they would hesitate to demonstrate. Finally, the anti-nuclear move-
ment developed during West Germany’s battle with terrorism, which included 
legislation that threatened civil liberties.15 
                                                             
14  Kirsten, “Kommentar zur Öffentlichkeitsausschluß, Atom Express 28 (Mar./Apr. 1982): 12, 
and Kommentar zur Öffentlichkeitsausschluß, Atom Express 29 (May/June 1982): 17-27. 
15  Clamshell Alliance, For immediate release, May 6, 1977, UNH Clamshell, Series 1, Box 2, f2; 
JF, Attacken auf Grundrechte, Vorwärts (26 Feb. 1981), PA-Presse, 102-18/24, 8; zum Brok-
dorf-Demonstrationsverbot, Heute Mittag, SWF, 23 Feb. 1981, PA-Presse, 102-18/24, 8; 
Presseerklärung Bürgerinitiative Umweltschutz Unterelbe, 14 Feb. 1977, PAB, Brokdorf Be-
wegung 76/77; Kapituliert die Strafjustiz?, Die Zeit (10), 5 Mar. 1982; Die Liberalisierung hat 
sich nicht bewährt, Der Spiegel 35 (46), 9 Nov. 1981; Die Rechnung vor der Polizei, Die Zeit 
49 (27 Nov. 1981); Recht. Dank mit Rechnung, Der Spiegel 36 (33), 16 Aug. 1982; Rudolf 
Augstein, Atomstaat oder Rechtsstaat, ibid. 31 (10), 28 Feb. 1977. 
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2.6  Religion and Resistance 
The relative weakness of religion as a force in German life played a role as 
well. In the Federal Republic, support for nonviolent civil disobedience, with 
an acceptance of punishment, often came out of the Lutheran church (Schüring 
2012). For example, Theodor Ebert, a layman who held church leadership 
roles, played a central role in promoting civil disobedience (Ebert 1984). A 
number of Lutheran pastors and church workers actively supported civil diso-
bedience and occasionally participated in it, e.g., blockading the plant-site in 
Brokdorf. Yet a German tradition of anti-clericalism meant that people of faith 
could be ignored or ridiculed in public discourse in a way that just was not 
possible in the United States, where even most radicals know that it is impossi-
ble to build a mass movement without support from religious believers and 
churches committed to the social gospel (Kühle 1976, 66; Benedict 1981, 53-6; 
Seehase 1976). And Germans could not easily appeal to a concept of civil 
disobedience as an act of “witness,” independent of its immediate effects, 
whereas American protesters did (Birchler and Miller 1981, 70; Jezer 1977, 21-
2). Civil disobedience in the US had some non-religious roots (e.g., sit-ins by 
workers in the 1930s (Cooney and Michalowski 1977)), and many anti-nuclear 
protesters were not religious. Yet since the successful Civil Rights Movement, 
civil disobedience in the US has had a powerful religious thrust that influences 
expectations and actions.16 
Rather than appeal to religion, Germans appealed to resistance. (Meyer et al. 
1984) West Germany’s constitution guaranteed each German the right of re-
sistance against any threat to the constitutional order, if other means were una-
vailable. Anti-nuclear-power activists referred repeatedly to this constitutional 
right as they asserted their right to act, even by breaking laws, against the dire 
threat nuclear power posed (Küchenhoff 1980, 27, 29, 31). Indeed, they fre-
quently asserted, “When Recht (justice or law) becomes Unrecht (injustice), 
resistance becomes a duty.” Conservatives and supporters of nuclear power 
complained that this constitutional right applied only when the constitutional 
order was threatened, not when a citizen disliked a policy outcome. Yet oppo-
nents of nuclear power were adamant that the constitutional order was in fact at 
risk (Meyer-Tasch 1988, 33, 42). They argued that nuclear radiation and waste 
threatened everyone’s constitutionally guaranteed “bodily integrity” and that 
the state could only protect against nuclear terrorism by suspending the consti-
tution (Atomstaat). Resistance was rhetorically powerful, given widespread 
praise for those few who had dared resist, even violently, the Nazi regime – and 
                                                             
16  Brokdorf und die Kirche, Deutsche Zeitung, 10 Dec. 1976, PA Presse, 102-18/24, 1; Atom-
strom. Symbol auf Konto, Der Spiegel (34), 21 Aug. 1978; Seabrook Votes Down Nuke, but 
Public Service Won’t Abide by Decision, Granite State Independence 15 (Apr 1976), UNH 
Clamshell, Oversize Box 4. 
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condemnation for the many who had not. Moreover, few by the 1970s thought 
that anti-Hitler resisters deserved punishment for resistance. Ultimately, Ger-
man anti-nuclear activists could not give civil disobedience a widely acceptable 
face by appealing to religion; they sought to do so by appealing, usually sin-
cerely, to a constitutional right to resistance (cf. Schüring 2012). West Germans 
were thereby adapting civil disobedience through a culturally persuasive rheto-
ric that evoked a quasi-revolutionary situation in which the petty constraints of 
legality could seem at best irrelevant, while violence against things, and per-
haps even against people, could seem the only legitimate recourse. Thus re-
sistance could serve for many Germans as a morally legitimating functional 
substitute for religion – but with very, very different consequences.17 
2.7  Attitudes toward the State 
Activists in the US and West Germany had very differing attitudes toward the 
state, and hence to civil disobedience (Joppke 1993, esp. 79-82, 114-5). In the 
1960s and 1970s in both the US and West Germany an often militant New Left 
attacked the legitimacy of the prevailing economic, political, and cultural or-
ders. In the US, however, the Left shrank in the 1970s to its traditionally mar-
ginal status. Hence, the existing political and economic system retained for 
most Americans an indisputable legitimacy as a system (Aronowitz 1996, esp. 
49-50, 93-4).  
In West Germany, however, many anti-nuclear activists simply did not trust 
the state. The K-Gruppen and the Autonomen remained a significant political 
force. For them, the Federal Republic was a cabal of a ruling class of capital-
ists, hostile to the interests of the masses. They operated within a Leftist revo-
lutionary tradition that saw violent overthrow as the only hope for a truly dem-
ocratic future. Radicals and even moderates in the 1960s had seen the Federal 
Republic as fascistic because it failed to purge former Nazis from government, 
                                                             
17  Zehntausende demonstrieren in Bonn gegen die Kernkraft, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
15 Oct. 1979, PA Presse, 102-18/24, 6; Herbert Riehl-Heyse, Mobilmachung in der Wilster 
Marsch, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 28 Feb. 1981, PA Presse, 102-18/24, 8; Wo Recht zu Unrecht 
wird, wird Widerstand zur Pflicht, Unsere Zeit, 27 Feb. 1981, PA Presse, 102-18/24, 9; Ham-
burger Initiative Kirchliche Mitarbeiter und gewaltfreie Aktion et al., Wir müssen unsere 
Meinung zeigen, damit morgen die Mehrheit mit uns Widerstand leistet, AA H, Brokdorf-
Blockaden Gewaltfreie Aktionsgruppen; Bauern bei Albrecht, Atom Express 11 (Dec. 1978): 
39; Helmut Ostermeyer, Wehrt euch, leistet Widerstand!, Die Unabhängigen (1 Oct. 1977), 
AsD, NL Ewald Gaul, 1EGAE000004; Dr. Stäglich, Offener Brief, Die Bauernschaft (1) 1977, 
März, BAK B342/637; BBU, Alternatives Arbeitspapier zur Energiepolitik, 14 Nov. 1977, BAK, 
B196/34251; BI Lüchow-Dannenberg, BBU, Freundeskreis der BI Lüchow-Dannenberg, Auf-
ruf zum Widerstand! PAB, Gorleben. Wendland Bewegung, -1982; BI Lüchow-Dannenberg, 
Presseerklärung, 26 Oct. 1978, AA H, Gorleben. Bundesweite Zusammenarbeit von gewalt-
freien Aktionsgruppen; Ariane et al., Eindrücke vom Anti-AKW Sommercamp‚ 79, radikal. 
Sozialistische Ztg. für Westberlin Extrablatt (Aug. 1979): 4. 
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civil service, and judiciary. (Koenen 2001; Geronimo 2012; Weber-Zucht 
1977) Even otherwise moderate opponents of nuclear power, Theo Sommer 
wrote, had often lost faith in the state and “because they feel left in the lurch by 
the institutions, they take on themselves the right to resist” (Sommer 1977). 
Protesters occupying a proposed nuclear-waste storage site briefly established a 
consensus-democracy, the Free Republic of the Wendland, as an alternative to 
the Federal Republic’s representative democracy. The American anti-nuclear 
movement included some who were just as skeptical of the Establishment as 
were many West Germans, but their influence was marginal. Because the Fed-
eral Republic lacked the American republic’s reservoir of good will, West 
Germans were more likely to see violence as acceptable and punishment by the 
state as unacceptable.18 
2.8  Partial Convergence 
West Germans did develop over time a style of civil disobedience somewhat 
more similar to American practice. As the anti-nuclear-power movement in 
West Germany was declining in the early 1980s, an even broader peace and 
anti-nuclear-missile movement adopted nonviolent civil disobedience and 
engaged in nonviolent blockades on a massive scale, with frequent arrests. That 
movement was much more influenced by the churches (Lepp 2012). It was, as 
a “peace” movement, much more able to isolate violent demonstrators. In their 
own learning process, police also moved toward a “de-escalation strategy,” so 
that police brutality was less than against anti-nuclear-power demonstrators 
(Becker-Schaum 2012). However, German movements generally still rejected 
any punishment for acts of civil disobedience as “criminalization” and sought 
to legalize civil disobedience for people with good motives (Butterwege 1985; 
Quint 2008). A renewed anti-nuclear-power movement after Chernobyl still 
included violence, as at Wackersdorf and Brokdorf in 1986. Subsequently, a 
massive civil disobedience movement developed against the transport of nucle-
ar waste, a movement that relies on nonviolent affinity groups, widespread train-
ing, and arrests quite similarly to its American antecedents – albeit, still without 
any embrace of arrest and with some sabotage. The decline of the K-Gruppen and 
the Autonomen and of CDU/CSU efforts to criminalize dissent, changes in protest 
policing, and perhaps time to adjust, have changed the context and made possible 
                                                             
18  BBU Konferenz, Atom Express 6 (Jan./Feb. 1978): 14; Kommentar zum Öffentlichkeitsaus-
schluß, Atom Express 29 (May/June 1982): esp. p.20; Werner Birkenmaier, Brokdorf und das 
Recht, Stuttgarter Zeitung 2 Mar. 1981, PA-Presse, 102-18/24, 9; [no title], Kommunistische 
Volkszeitung 20 Jan. 1977, PAB, Brokdorf Bewegung 76/77; AStA Info [Hamburg], [Feb. 
1977], ibid.; Zäune umlegen, auf den Bauplatz vordringen, Der Spiegel 31 (8), 14 Feb. 1977; 
Sabine Rosenbladt, Der Atomstaat schlägt seine Kinder, konkret (July 1980), PA-Presse, 102-
18/24, 7. 
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the adaptation of more elements from a foreign tradition, but Germans continue 
to have their own conception of civil disobedience.19 
3.  Conclusions 
Transnational connections are crucial to understanding civil disobedience’s 
development. As a mass movement it first blossomed in South Asia. To bring it 
to the US, Americans had to adapt it to their context (Scalmer 2011). West 
German anti-nuclear-power protesters saw themselves as members of an inter-
national movement, so they were quite open to adapting tactics from abroad, 
including civil disobedience from the US. Nonetheless, they could only do so 
on their own terms. 
West Germany was, of course, not the US, so German civil disobedience 
would inevitably be different from American. A few West Germans proved 
willing to adopt American conceptions of civil disobedience as normative. 
Nonetheless, 1970s West Germans were operating within a different historical 
context and a different political culture. They sought to engage in civil disobe-
dience against a state many of them deeply mistrusted, a mistrust only 
strengthened by police brutality and by the obvious intention of some politi-
cians to severely limit, perhaps to criminalize, dissent. And they sought to 
legitimate civil disobedience by appeal to resistance, a powerful concept with a 
constitutional basis and historical resonances from Leftist ideology and anti-
Nazi resistance. Hence, many West German anti-nuclear protesters could find 
militant, perhaps violent, activism fully justified. The movement sought to 
distance itself from violence, but the demands of solidarity made it impossible, 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, to do so in ways that satisfied both its own 
membership and outside observers. Not all Americans were willing to go to jail 
for civil disobedience, and some West Germans were. Nonetheless, the Ameri-
can anti-nuclear movement developed in a context where willingness to go to 
jail for civil disobedience was honored by many. Absent any historical memory 
of civil disobedience or strong religious belief, very few West Germans could 
or would embrace going to jail. West German anti-nuclear protesters, seeing 
themselves as resisters, generally denied to the state they mistrusted any right 
to treat protesters as criminals, apparently no matter what laws they broke. 
The networks that transfer ideas and practices from one nation to another are 
important, but they run up against human beings, cultures, and institutions that 
inevitably react on their own terms. Understanding historical developments 
transnationally hence requires understanding not only how ideas and practices 
from one culture are made available within another culture; it also requires 
                                                             
19  Hau weg den Scheiß, Der Spiegel 40 (36), 1 Sept. 1986. 
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recognizing that a culture or nation will never just adopt ideas and practices 
from another society whole. Hence, we must work (hard) to understand how 
and why nations come to adapt from others what they do – and what they do 
not. 
References 
Aronowitz, Stanley. 1996. The Death and Rebirth of American Radicalism. NY: 
Routledge. 
Atom Express, ed. 1997. …und auch nicht anderswo! Die Geschichte der Anti-
AKW Bewegung. Göttingen: Verlag Die Werkstatt. 
Becker-Schaum, Christoph, et al., eds. 2012. Entrüstet euch: Nuklearkrise, NATO-
Doppelbeschluss und Friedensbewegung. Paderborn: Schöningh. 
Bell, Inge Powell. 1968. CORE and the Strategy of Nonviolence. NY: Random 
House. 
Benedict, Hans-Jürgen. 1981. …den reibungslosen Ablauf der Atomindustrie be-
hindern. Gewaltfreie Aktion 49/50: 53-9. 
Birchler, Susan, and Jane Miller. 1981. Diablo Blockade. Santa Cruz, CA: Diablo 
Writing Collective. 
Butterwege, Christoph, et al., eds. 1985. Kriminalisierung der Friedensbewegung. 
Abschreckung nach innen? Köln: presseverlag ralf theurer. 
Chabot, Sean, and Jan Willem Duyvendak. 2002. Globalization and Transnational 
Diffusion between Social Movements: Reconceptualizing the Dissemination of 
the Gandhian Repertoire and the ‘Coming Out’ Routine. Theory and Society 31 
(6): 697-740. 
Cooney, Robert, and Helen Michalowski. 1977. The Power of the People. Active 
Nonviolence in the United States. n.p.: n.p. 
Daubert, Victoria, and Sue Ellen Moran. 1985. Origins, Goals, and Tactics of the 
U.S. Anti-Nuclear Protest Movement. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp. 
Dokumentation zum Brokdorf-Prozess gegen Michael Duffke + Markus Mohr. 
1982. Bremen: n.p. 
Ebert, Theodor. 1984. Ziviler Ungehorsam. Von der APO zur Friedensbewegung. 
Waldkirch: Waldkircher Verlagsgesellschaft. 
Geronimo. 2012. Fire and Flames. A history of the german autonomist movement, 
trans. Gabriel Kuhn. Oakland: PM Press. 
Glotz, Peter, ed. 1983. Ziviler Ungehorsam im Rechtsstaat. Frankfurt/M: edition 
Suhrkamp. 
Gyorgy, Anna, et al. 1979. No Nukes: everyone’s guide to nuclear power. Boston: 
South End Press. 
Jezer, Marty. 1977. Learning from the Past to Meet the Future. WIN magazine June 
16 (23): 17-23. 
Kidder, Tracy. 1978. Nonviolent war against nuclear power. Atlantic Monthly 242 
(Sept.): 70-6. 
King, Jr., Martin Luther. 1958. Stride toward Freedom. The Montgomery Story. 
NY: Harper & Row Publishers. 
HSR 39 (2014) 1  │  252 
King, Jr., Martin Luther. 1991. The Time for Freedom has Come. In A Testament of 
Hope. The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr., ed. James 
M. Washington. NY: Harper One. 
Kirchhof, Astrid Mignon, and Jan-Henrik Meyer. 2014. Global Protest Against 
Nuclear Power. Transfer and Transnational Exchange in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Historical Social Research 39 (1): 165-190. 
Kleinert, Ulfrid, ed. 1981. Gewaltfrei widerstehen. Brokdorf-Protokoll gegen 
Schlagstöcke und Steine. Reinbek bei Hamburg: rororo aktuell. 
Klimke, Martin. 2010. The Other Alliance. Student Protest in West Germany and 
the United States in the Global Sixties. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. 
Koenen, Gerd. 2001. Das rote Jahrzehnt. Unsere kleine deutsche Kulturrevolution. 
Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch.  
Küchenhoff, Erich. 1983. Ziviler Ungehorsam als aktiver Verfassungsschutz. Deut-
sche Polizei 9: 27-31. 
Kühle, Manfred. 1976. Im Talar vor der Mauer von Brokdorf. Gewaltfreie Aktion 
28/29/30: 64-6. 
Lepp, Claudia. 2012. Zwischen Konfrontation und Kooperation: Kirchen und sozia-
le Bewegungen in der Bundesrepublik (1950-1983). Zeithistorische Forschun-
gen/Studies in Contemporary History 7 (3). 
Markovits, Andrei S., and Philip S. Gorski. 1993. The German Left. Red, Green and 
Beyond. NY: Oxford Univ. Press. 
Mayer-Tasch, Peter. 1988. Widerstandsrecht und Widerstandspflicht im Zeichen 
der Sozioökologische Krise. In Widerstand im Rechtsstaat, ed. Peter Saladin and 
Beat Sitter, 29-40. Freiburg/Schweiz: Universitätsverlag Freiburg. 
Meyer, Jan-Henrik. 2011. Appropriating the Environment. How the European Institu-
tions Received the Novel Idea of the Environment and Made it Their Own. Research 
College “The Transformative Power of Europe”, Free University Berlin <http:// 
www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/en/v/transformeurope/publications/working_paper/WP_31 
_Meyer_neu.pdf> (accessed November 15, 2013). 
Mossmann, Walter. 1975. ‘Die Bevölkerung ist hellwach!’ Erfahrungen aus dem 
Kampf der Badisch-Elsässischen Bevölkerung gegen ein Atomkraftwerk in Wyhl 
und ein Bleiwerk in Marckolsheim. Kursbuch 39: 129-53. 
Painke, Uwe. 1997. Training für Gewaltfreiheit, ed. Christian Büttner et al. Politik 
von unten. Sonderband der gewaltfreien Aktion 111 (12): 167-77. 
Peters, Shawn Francis. 2012. The Catonsville Nine. A Story of Faith and Resistance 
in the Vietnam Era. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. 
Quint, Peter E. 2008. Civil disobedience and the German Courts: the Pershing 
missile protests in comparative perspective. London: Routledge Cavendish. 
Rodenko, Igal. 1979. Pros and Cons – The October 6 Occupation. WIN magazine 
September 27: 14-6. 
Rosenblith, Murray. 1977. Surrounded by Acres of Clams. WIN magazine June 16 
(23): 4-10. 
Rucht, Dieter. 1984. Recht auf Widerstand? Aktualität, Legitimität und Grenzen 
‘zivilen Ungehorsams’. In An die Grenzen der Mehrheitsdemokratie, ed. Bernd 
Guggenberger and Claus Offe. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 
Scalmer, Sean. 2011. Gandhi in the West. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 
Schüring, Michael. 2012. West German Protestants and the Campaign against 
Nuclear Technology. Central European History 45 (4): 744-62 
HSR 39 (2014) 1  │  253 
Seehase, Gerhard. 1976. Den Talar brauchten sie nicht zu verbergen. Die Zeit 52 
(17 Dec.). 
Smith, Kenneth, and Ira G. Zepp, Jr. 1986. Search for the Beloved Community. 
Lanham, MD: Univ. Press of America. 
Sommer, Theo. 1977. Die Kernkraft spaltet unser Land. Die Zeit 10 (4 Mar.).  
Spörl, Gerhard. 1982. Bürgerkriegsjustiz. Die Zeit 21 (21 May). 
Sternstein, Wolfgang. 1981a. Blockade in Brokdorf – ein Aktionsbericht. Gewalt-
freie Aktion 47/48. 
Sternstein, Wolfgang. 1981b. Gewaltfreier Volksaufstand. Gewaltfreie ‘Guerilla’ 
Aktion. graswurzel revolution 55 (June): 25-7. 
Sternstein, Wolfgang. 1982. Brokdorf Blockade Diskussion. graswurzel revolution 
61: 34-35. 
Varon, Jeremy. 2004. Bringing the War Home. The Weather Underground, the Red 
Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies. Berkeley: 
Univ. of California Press.  
Wasserman, Harvey. 1977. Clamshell Alliance: getting it together. Progressive 41 
(Sept. 1977): 14-8. 
Wasserman, Harvey. 1978. Seabrook Occupation 1978. WIN magazine June 22. 
Weber-Zucht, Helga. 1977. Atomkraft? Nein Danke! WIN magazine XIII 24: 8-9. 
Wehler, Hans-Ulrich. 2010. “Transnationale Geschichte – der neue Königsweg 
historischer Forschung?” In Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und 
Theorien, ed. Gunilla Budde et al., 161-74. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 
Werner, Michael, and Bénédicte Zimmermann. 2004. Introduction. De la Compa-
raison à L’Histoire Croisée. Paris: Seuil. 
Werner, Michael, and Bénédicte Zimmermann. 2006. Beyond Comparison: Histoire 
Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity. History and Theory 45: 30-50. 
Wüstenhagen, Hans Helmut. 1975. Bürger gegen Kernkraftwerke. Wyhl der An-
fang? Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch. 
Zinn, Howard. 1968. Disobedience and Democracy. Nine Fallacies on Law and 
Order. NY: Random House. 
Zint, Günter, et al. 1980. Republik Freies Wendland. Eine Dokumentation: Frank-
furt/M: Zweitausendeins. 
Zunes, Stephen. Sept. 1978. ‘Seabrook’ a turning point. Progressive 42: 28-30. 
 
